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Introduction 
Although it is widely accepted that public health policy ought to be protected from 
tobacco industry interference, with the World Health Organization (WHO) enshrining 
this principle in Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, such an 
approach has not been applied to the alcohol industry, despite the fact that its products 
are also health damaging (Casswell 2013, Jarma 2013, Casswell and Thararangsi 2009, 
Collin 2012) and, by some measures, substantially more harmful in the UK (Nutt et al. 
2010).  
It might be argued that this different approach reflects the different behaviours of these 
two industries.  Yet, growing evidence suggests that the tactics employed by the alcohol 
industry to influence policy mirror those of the tobacco industry (Casswell 2013, Jahiel 
and Babor 2007, Freudenberg 2014, Stuckler et al. 2012).  Despite this evidence, the 
Scottish Government (like many other governments) has engaged with the alcohol 
industry in adopting approaches to address alcohol misuse and harm in collaborative 
ways (Casswell 2013, Casswell and Thararangsi 2009, Gornall 2013, McCambridge et al. 
2013) that currently seem inconceivable for tobacco (Collin 2012, Joosens and Raw 
2014). For example, in 2007, the Labour-led Scottish Government formally came together 
with the alcohol industry to form the Scottish Government & Alcohol Industry 
Partnership (SGAIP), in “recognition of a shared aim to promote responsible drinking and 
to reduce alcohol related harm,” (Scottish Government 2007); a partnership that 
continued under the subsequent leadership of the Scottish National Party(SGAIP 2014). 
This partnership involved a number of ‘work streams’, each of which required an 
‘industry co-lead’ to work alongside a Scottish Government lead (SGAIP 2014). Until 
recently, the partnership also involved the secondment of a fully industry funded post to 
the alcohol policy team in the Scottish Government (SGAIP 2010). Unlike the UK’s Public 
Health Responsibility Deal for alcohol (SGAIP 2010), the Scottish Partnership does not 
include any members from non-governmental organizations (Scottish Government 
2015). More recently, following its decision to shift the alcohol policy focus away from 
efforts to change individual behaviour towards a population-focused, price based 
approach (Katikireddi et al. 2014), the SNP-led Scottish Government has decided to 
discontinue the SGAIP (Scottish Government 2017).   
One important motivating factor in this shift seems likely to be the fact that alcohol-
related harm responds to a burden that weighs heavily on the Scottish state and the tax-
funded National Health Service (NHS). Between 2013 and 2014, 36,206 people were 
discharged for alcohol related injuries from general acute care hospitals in Scotland and 
the rate was 8.4 times higher for patients living in the most deprived areas of Scotland 
compared to the least deprived areas (Information Services Division Scotland 2014). This 
suggests that alcohol related harms play an important role in Scotland’s sizeable health 
inequalities (Leyland et al, 2007, Scottish Government 2015b), addressing which 
constitutes another stated policy priority of the current government (The Scottish 
Parliament 2015). More broadly, it has been estimated that alcohol misuse and harm cost 
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the Scottish economy approximately £1.1 billion per year through health related, criminal 
justice and social service related costs (YHEC 2010). 
Given these issues, the Scottish Government has directed a range of resources towards 
policies intended to reduce the harms associated with alcohol consumption.  The most 
high profile recent example is the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Bill (MUP), 
which was introduced in 2011 and passed in 2012, but for which implementation has 
been delayed by successive legal challenges from the Scotch Whisky Association (Scottish 
Government 2015c, Morris 2015). The MUP legislation stipulated a formula for 
determining an alcoholic beverage’s retail price. For example, a 750 ml bottle of red wine 
at 12.5% alcohol by volume (ABV) could not sell below the minimum price of £4.68 if the 
MUP was £0.50 [0.50 x .750 x 0.125 x 100= 4.68] (Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) 
Bill 2012). The legislation’s main targets are cheap, high strength alcohols sold by off-
trade retailers (Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Bill 2012). 
Given the health aims of the MUP Bill, it was subject to scrutiny by the Scottish 
Parliament’s Health and Sport Committee. As part of this process, the Committee 
launched a call for written evidence on the topic and all relevant stakeholders were 
invited to participate (SPICE 2012). The alcohol industry’s obvious interest in the MUP 
Bill was reflected in extensive engagement in the consultation, and 19.5% (n=25) of the 
total submissions came from this sector.  
Against the backdrop of the Scottish Government’s commitment to MUP, several 
academic papers have been published which seek to better understand alcohol industry 
interests in, and claims about, this issue (McCambridge et al. 2013, Katikireddi et al. 2014, 
Hilton et al. 2014, Holden et al. 2012). This includes a paper by McCambridge and 
colleagues (2013) which presents an analysis of the evidence used by the alcohol industry 
in submissions to the Scottish Parliament’s 2008 public consultation on a Government 
discussion paper, Changing Scotland’s relationship with Alcohol (Scottish Government 
2009).  Their review found that alcohol industry submissions often promote weak 
evidence to support their positions, whilst also misrepresenting strong evidence against 
their positions. Responding to the dearth of studies of alcohol industry documents noted 
by McCambridge and colleagues (2013), this paper aims to strengthen the literature base 
using alcohol industry submissions from the more recent, 2011 call for written evidence 
concerning the MUP Bill. This paper builds on published work in aiming to specifically to 
assess the extent to which alcohol industry actors cited evidence in submissions to call 
for written evidence on the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Bill and to compare 
any citations of peer-reviewed evidence to original sources (whereas McCambridge and 
colleagues focused on analysing alcohol industry evidence against “the most 
authoritative and up-to-date international review of the effectiveness of alcohol policy 
measures by Babor and colleagues”) (McCambridge et al. 2013). Although other groups 
of actors, for example, councils and NGOs also engaged with peer-reviewed evidence, 
their submissions overwhelmingly supported the MUP policy in line with the available 
public health evidence. The alcohol industry, in contrast, was the largest and most 
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significant group to oppose the MUP bill, and as such, we found analysis of their use of 
evidence to be of greater interest. To date, we are unaware of any publication that which 
has either considered this set of policy submissions or which has examined this facet of 
alcohol industry use of evidence.  
Methods 
Submissions to the call for written evidence are publicly available via the Scottish 
Parliament website available at: 
[http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/CurrentCommittees/4556
3.aspx]. All submissions, inclusive of those ‘received in response to the call for evidence’ 
and those labelled under, ‘other written evidence received’, ‘written evidence received in 
response to the call for views on pricing mechanisms’, and ‘correspondence received’  
(n=128) were manually searched to identify those written by ‘alcohol industry’ actors. 
While there is no settled definition of the alcohol industry (IAS 2016), for the purposes of 
this paper, these were identified as commercial sector actors involved with the 
distribution, production and/or sale of alcoholic beverages (e.g. on and off-trade actors), 
and any organization representing the interests of this sector (e.g. lobbying/consultancy 
companies or trade groups working on behalf of commercial alcohol companies). Using 
this definition, the alcohol industry was the third most represented group of the 128 
submissions, accounting for 19.5% of the total submissions, behind non-governmental 
organizations (34.4%) and local councils (21.1%), as shown in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1] 
We examined the reference lists of all alcohol industry submissions and categorised 
evidence citations into the following four groups as shown in Table 2: 1) Peer-reviewed 
2) Governmental Reports/Data 3) Independent Organization Reports/Data 4) Other. 
‘Peer-reviewed’ literature is defined as material published in academic peer-reviewed 
journals and academic books. ‘Governmental Reports/Data’ refer to materials produced 
by a government directly, by a government funded public body, or commissioned by a 
government. ‘Independent Organization Reports/Data’ are reports produced by a private 
or third sector organization which are not related to or regulated by a government 
organization (e.g. think-tank or private market research). We used ‘Other’ for any other 
source that did not fit in the three categories just described, including for references for 
which the origin was unclear and expert opinion. The most commonly cited category of 
evidence was government reports/data representing 45% of the total citations, followed 
by the independent organization reports/data and peer-reviewed categories with 30% 
and 15% of the total citations, respectively (see Table 2). Alcohol industry submissions 
were also categorised according to the extent to which they supported MUP. The majority 
of alcohol industry submissions, 12 out of the 19 (63%), were opposed to MUP, with only 
2 (11%) submissions in favour of MUP and the other 5 (26%) unclear or partially 
supportive of MUP. We further examined whether these alcohol industry actors 
participated in the prior 2009 call for evidence on MUP conducted by the Scottish 
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Parliament’s Health and Sport Committee as part of the introduction of primary 
legislation process, and compared submissions’ positions across consultations using 
support level categorisations for the 2009 call for evidence reported by a previous paper 
(Katikireddi and Hilton 2015). With the exception of the Wine and Spirit Trade 
Association, every respondent from the 2011 call for evidence participated in the 2009 
call for evidence (see Table 2). The support level for MUP across alcohol industry actors’ 
submissions to both calls for evidence remained relatively constant over the 2 year 
period, with only 2 alcohol industry actors changing support category despite the fact 
more evidence had been published in the interim period. [Insert Table 2] Figure 1 shows 
the total number of peer-reviewed sources cited by each submission against the total 
number of references per submission.  Respondents from the alcohol industry who 
opposed MUP cited peer-reviewed material more than the other groups of alcohol 
industry respondents. Almost all alcohol industry submissions opposed to MUP cite at 
least one peer-reviewed source with Diageo citing the most (n=8). 
[Insert Table 2] 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Our approach, detailed in the next section, was based on a content analysis, grouped into 
broad themes and organized by the level of accuracy with which peer-reviewed evidence 
is cited within alcohol industry submissions. Our assessment of accuracy was determined 
by the lead author comparing the citations to the original sources and making an 
assessment which was then checked against the assessment of one of the other authors. 
Disagreements or uncertainties about how to classify citations were resolved through 
discussion between all three authors. 
 
Results 
 
The following analysis assesses only peer-reviewed evidence cited by alcohol industry 
submissions. This is because, of the four evidence categories, peer-reviewed evidence has 
a particular significance as the only category to have a “quality assurance” stamp 
provided via other experts independently appraising the research and analysis for its 
“validity, significance and originality” (Voice of Young Science 2012), albeit a view that 
has been challenged by some(Smith 2006, Weller 2001). Previous research has already 
explored how alcohol industry actors have selectively highlighted evidence and figures 
from governmental sources that are favourable to their arguments (Katikireddi et al. 
2014) and produce and employs their own evidence to support their preferred policy 
approaches (Jernigan 2009). It could therefore be argued that policymakers already have 
a sufficient evidence base to treat alcohol industry submissions citing such broader kinds 
of evidence with caution.  
 
The section below considers how accurately alcohol industry submissions cited peer-
reviewed evidence against the original sources. In total, we identified 17 citations used 
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to support 5 overarching claims across 7 alcohol industry submissions. Of these, we 
assessed that comparing the citation to the original source, only 18% were accurately 
cited with the remaining 82% being in some way questionably or inaccurately cited. A 
summary is presented below in Table 3. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
Claims which were Accurately Cited 
 
In this section we describe one overarching claim against MUP that we identified as being 
supported by 3 citations of peer-reviewed evidence.  
Challenging the legality of MUP  
In response to issues over the legality of MUP, the Edrington Group (2011), Scottish 
Grocer’s Federation (2011) and Scotch Whisky Association (SWA) (2011) cite Baumberg 
and Anderson (2008) to support claims that multiple academic sources question the 
legality of implementing MUP, which in the case of the SWA can be regarded as something 
of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Baumberg and Anderson (2008) do suggest it “seems 
strongly likely that minimum pricing for alcohol will not be seen as permissible”. Thus, 
with regards to the specific point about legality, these alcohol industry submissions’ 
claims are accurately supported by peer-reviewed evidence. However, it is worth noting 
that while Baumberg and Anderson’s paper queries the feasibility of MUP, it also 
explicitly states it is the “price of the cheapest beverage that has the greatest influence on 
levels of consumption” (Baumberg and Anderson 2008) and, in this sense, is supportive 
of MUP as a policy response.  
Claims which were Questionably Cited  
This section presents four overarching claims, supported in industry submissions by 14 
citations of peer-reviewed evidence which, on examination, appear to have been used in 
a manner that could be construed as inaccurate or misleading (e.g. by overstating the 
strength of the underlying evidence or which are unlikely to be transferrable to a Scottish 
contexts). The following analysis is organized according to two sub-categories, with  
‘selective accurately’  used to reflect claims which did accurately reflect data or 
arguments advanced in the source document, but did not reflect the broader analysis or 
conclusions of cited work, and ‘inaccurate’ used to reflect claims that more fundamentally 
did not represent the cited work.  
Selectively Accurate  
Challenging the Relationship between Price and Alcohol Consumption  
The policy submission by Diageo (2011) cites peer-reviewed evidence to support three 
different points relating to the company’s efforts to challenge the claimed relationship 
between price and alcohol consumption that underpins MUP.  The first point simply 
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states (Diageo 2011) that “the assumption of an inverse relationship between levels of 
taxation and total per capita consumption is largely based on basic economic theory and 
the relationship between supply and demand, as well as models projecting the impact of 
reduced taxation on drinking” and cites three peer-reviewed references (Andreasson et 
al. 2006, Edwards et al. 1995, Holder et al. 1995). Two of these three references consider 
the impact of reduced taxation on drinking in Scandinavia (Andreasson et al. 2006, 
Holder et al. 1995); one is a modelling study (Holder et al. 1995) (providing support for 
the claim that some of the available evidence base employs basic economic theory), but 
the other is a comparison of a predictive study with indicators of the actual impacts of 
reduced taxes in Sweden and it concludes that the predictive study “provided reasonable 
results” (Andreasson et al. 2006) which hardly strengthens a critique of this genre of 
evidence. Only one of these three references (Edwards et al. 1995) makes a specific claim 
about the methodological nature of the available evidence regarding price and 
consumption; the book chapter notes that the majority of studies on this topic are 
econometric, while also noting that studies with a variety of other methods exist (which 
the chapter goes on to review). Not only does this book chapter not make the precise 
claim that Diageo make but, since it was published over twenty years ago, it cannot in any 
way be considered a reliable assessment of the current evidence-base (Edwards et al. 
1995). Indeed, all three citations are rather dated, the book chapter and the predictive 
modelling study were both published in 1995 (Edwards et al. 1995, Holder et al. 1995). 
In summary, none of these citations provide up-to-date support for the claim advanced 
by Diageo.  
 
Regarding the same overarching claim, Diageo (2011) cites Österberg (1995) to support 
their second point that “consumers respond differently to price changes in different 
countries”. This a non-controversial claim and the chapter, written by Österberg (1995), 
does support this point but is yet another dated text, having been published in 1995.  
 
Diageo (2011) also cites Mäkelä and colleagues (2008) to support their third point, 
“…recent empirical evidence from Denmark, Finland, and Sweden indicates that despite 
predictions to the contrary, the lowering of the price of alcohol (through decreased 
taxation) did not lead to increased consumption.”  Whilst, Mäkelä and colleagues’ (2008) 
study, based on survey data, does establish lower taxes on alcohol in Finland compared 
to bordering Sweden and Denmark did not lead to higher population level alcohol 
consumption, the paper also finds that Finland’s liver cirrhosis rates increased by 20% 
over the period in which taxes declined (Mäkelä et al. 2008), indicating that lower taxes 
increased consumption among heavier drinkers, leading to increased alcohol-related 
harms. Thus, lowering of prices, may not have had a large effect on population level 
consumption, but clearly exacerbated heavy drinking within the country. Additionally, 
the authors acknowledge survey data is prone to non-response bias, which is an 
important limitation and could contribute to their null finding regarding increased 
consumption. Taking the full results and limitations into account, this paper provides 
minimal support for Diageo’s position.   
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While these specific claims presented above are accurately cited, the overall context and 
conclusions of such research are not evident in the Diageo submission. Importantly, the 
Diageo document does not make clear that all five peer-reviewed references it cites to 
question evidence of the relationship between alcohol price and consumption 
(Andreasson et al. 2006, Edwards et al. 1995, Holder et al. 1995, Österberg 1995, Mäkelä 
et al. 2008) actually conclude that there is a clear relationship between the two. 
 
Querying the Role of MUP in Reducing Alcohol-Related Harm 
Diageo (2011), SWA (2011) and Edrington Group (2011) cite Babor and colleagues 
(2010) to support their claim that, “There is no strong evidence as to the effectiveness of 
minimum pricing as a policy to reduce alcohol-related harm.” This phrase is used 
identically in all three submissions, suggesting a collective strategy in advancing this 
claim. Babor and colleagues’ (2010) book overwhelming supports price controls as an 
effective method of alcohol control policy, however, they do write, “Although minimum 
pricing (or floor pricing) has been implemented in some jurisdictions…there has been 
almost no research into its impact on consumption or harm.” Thus, the submissions do 
not technically misquote Babor and colleagues, but fail to interpret this singular 
statement within the book’s wider context. For example, following this quoted statement, 
Babor and colleagues conclude, “Despite the lack of research in this area, a complex 
modelling process using data from England and Wales suggest that minimum prices for a 
standard unit of alcohol would be one of the most effective ways to reduce alcohol-related 
problems,” (Babor et al. 2010). The suggestion within these three alcohol industry policy 
submissions that this study supports their claim of a lack of evidence of effectiveness for 
MUP is therefore misleading.  
Inaccurate 
Challenging the Relationship between Price and Alcohol Consumption  
The previous section already identified that Diageo’s peer-reviewed citations to support 
challenges to the relationship between alcohol price and consumption were limited and 
out of date. This section demonstrates that the peer-reviewed citations employed to 
advance this argument in other alcohol industry submissions were more fundamentally 
inaccurate.  The submission from supermarket chain, WM Morrison, claims that, “Whilst 
[heavy drinkers] are more likely to switch from one drink to another if the price of the 
former exceeds the latter, they are less likely to reduce their overall alcohol consumption 
in the event of a general, across the board price increase”, (WM Morrison 2011) and cites 
two references, Gallet (2007) and Wagenaar and colleagues (2009). These two papers 
support the sub-claim that consumers are “likely to switch from one drink to another if 
the price of the former exceeds the latter” because both papers show differences in price 
elasticities for different groups of alcohol (Gallet 2007, Wagenaar et al. 2009). However, 
they do not provide support for the larger contextual claim that price increases are not 
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likely to reduce overall consumption for heavy drinkers. Indeed, Gallet’s meta-analysis 
study of price elasticities (Gallet 2007) hardly mentions heavy drinkers, noting only in 
their conclusion that controlling for addiction in multiple regression did not materially 
change the model, signalling addiction is not a strong predictor of price elasticity of 
alcohol demand. There is no evidence in this paper to conclude heavier drinkers are less 
responsive to price changes in alcohol than moderate drinkers, nor that overall price 
increases would not result in less consumption. The only group this analysis found to be 
less responsive to price changes of alcohol in comparison to another group were younger 
ages versus older ages (Gallet 2007). We could also find no evidence in Wagenaar and 
colleagues’ systematic review and meta-analysis (Wagenaar et al. 2009) to support this 
claim. In fact, the abstract states, “A large literature establishes that beverage alcohol 
prices and taxes are inversely related to drinking. Effects are large compared to other 
prevention policies and programs. Public policies that raise prices of alcohol are an 
effective means to reduce drinking” (Wagenaar et al. 2009). Indeed, from the outset, the 
paper presents a view directly counter to WM Morrison’s claim, arguing that the available 
evidence shows that “price/tax also affects heavy drinking significantly”, while 
acknowledging that “the magnitude of effect is smaller than effects on overall drinking” 
(Wagenaar et al. 2009). 
 
Claiming that MUP will increase illicit trade 
Two submissions from Diageo (2011) and Wine and Spirit Trade Association (WSTA) 
(2011) cite Alavaikko and Osterber (2000) to support claims that MUP will fuel illicit and 
cross-border trade. For example, Diageo (2011) writes, “There is very strong evidence to 
suggest that price increases fuel illicit production or cross-border trade in alcohol, 
particularly where there is a disparity between one country and another.” However, the 
paper by Alavaikko and Osterber (2000) is largely a historical account of alcohol policy 
changes that occurred when Finland joined the European Economic Area (EAA) in 1994 
and the European Union in 1995.  It devotes only one short section to cross-border and 
illicit trade and here the focus is on the increase to cross-border imports and smuggling 
that occurred after Finland joined the EEA in 1994.  Although tax (and price) changes 
occurred in this period (in line with European requirements), the authors note that “the 
reform of alcohol taxation was put into force without reducing total state alcohol tax 
revenue”, being achieved by raising taxes on some products while lowering them on 
others (Alavaikko and Osterber 2000). While the authors acknowledge that the increases 
in legal and illegal alcohol imports might arguably provide a rationale for reducing 
Finland’s high alcohol taxes, the study does not provide clear evidence of price increases 
being linked to increases in illicit trade since: (i) the changes in prices of alcohol products 
were variable, with some products becoming cheaper; (ii) concurrent policy changes, 
notably the fact that Finland joined the European Economic Area, may explain the 
increase in traveller imports and smuggling the authors refer to. In addition, Finland’s 
particularly high alcohol taxes mark the country out as unusual, suggesting caution is 
needed in considering the transferability of this experience. All of this makes this source 
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a weak supporting reference for this point and far from the “very strong supporting 
evidence” Diageo and WSTA claim (Diageo 2011, WSTA 2011).  
 
In regards to the same overarching theme, Diageo (2011) additionally cites a paper by 
Nordlund (2007) which shows that cross-border sales between Norway and Sweden 
began to rise after EU regulations led to cheaper alcohol in Sweden versus Norway. 
However, the paper also reveals the price differentials between Sweden/Norway were 
relatively high, with spirits 25% cheaper in Sweden than Norway, wine 30% cheaper and 
beer 40% cheaper (Nordlund 2007). The exchange rate between the countries’ currency 
also made shopping in Sweden attractive for Norwegians.  Yet, despite this, cross-border 
trade at its height, accounted for only 5.5% of total Norwegian alcohol consumption, 
suggesting the problem was not severe (Nordlund 2007). Since price differentials 
between Scotland and England post MUP would be far smaller, and there would be no 
effect from different currencies, this example is unlikely to be transferable. 
Past Policy Experiences Demonstrate Effectiveness of MUP  
The submission from the Campaign for Real Ale (2011), which was the only alcohol 
industry submission not opposed to MUP to use peer-reviewed evidence, claims, 
“Minimum pricing or bans on below cost sales of alcohol and other products have been 
effective where they have been introduced in parts of Canada, the USA, Poland, Spain, 
Greece, Belgium, France and Luxembourg” referencing a paper by Anderson and Johnson 
(Anderson and Johnson 1999). Whilst this paper does support this claim with regards to 
gasoline in the USA, it fails to provide evidence for any other country’s experience or, 
indeed, any other product. . Since evidence from other countries that is specific to alcohol 
price control policies exists, it seems odd that this submission employed only one peer 
reviewed citation that relates solely related to gasoline (Anderson and Johnson 1999).  
Concluding discussion 
Existing studies have repeatedly called attention to the potential for corporate interests 
to shape research that they fund and this has led to calls for research funded, or 
undertaken, by tobacco, pharmaceutical and sugar industry interests to be treated with 
caution (Kearns et al. 2006, Barnes and Bero 1996, Goldacre 2014).  In this context, the 
process of peer-review, in which research analysis must be appraised by independent 
academic colleagues and considered to be sufficiently rigorous for publication, 
potentially performs an important ‘quality assurance’ role (Bornmann and Daniel 2010).  
Given the value that policy actors attach to the perceived trustworthiness of evidence, 
and the important role evidence played in the MUP debate (Bornmann and Daniel 2010, 
Katikireddi et al. 2015), citing supportive ‘peer-reviewed’ evidence seems likely to 
increase the credibility of claims being advanced within policy submissions.  Since our 
results find that the majority (82%) of the peer-reviewed citations in alcohol industry 
policy submissions concerning MUP were cited in ways that are questionable, and which 
therefore create potential to be misleading. We conclude that the claims advanced in 
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alcohol industry policy submissions need to be treated with caution, even when they 
appear to be supported by peer-reviewed evidence. 
The peer-reviewed citations that we classed as being misleadingly employed included 
examples in which assumptions appeared to have been made about the transferability of 
evidence from other geographical contexts, with very different alcohol pricing strategies 
and socio-economic contexts (Alavaikko and Osterber 2000, Nordlund 2007), and an 
example in which a single sentence was taken out of context. Here, the original source 
(Babor et al. 2010) only very briefly discusses MUP but where it does, Babor and 
colleagues (2010) explicitly state that this policy approach, “may be the most effective 
way of ensuring price increases result in decreased consumption,” (Babor et al. 2010). 
Since the expressed aim of the Scottish Government, in pursuing MUP, has been to reduce 
alcohol-related harms, efforts to undermine its perceived potential effectiveness 
represents perhaps the most serious challenge in the submissions that argued against 
MUP.  It is therefore an important finding that, despite being presented in a manner that 
suggested alcohol industry actors had identified peer-reviewed evidence to support their 
claim of unproven effectiveness, an examination of the cited source found it was, in fact, 
supportive of MUP as an effective policy approach. 
In addition to employing some peer-reviewed references misleadingly, it is worth noting 
we also found examples in which alcohol industry submissions’ use of peer-reviewed 
evidence contradicted sections of their submission elsewhere. For example, in the 
sentence preceding the one in which Diageo (2011) appropriately cite Österberg (1995) 
to support their claim, “…similar alcohol policies yield different results in different 
societies because of the different economic, cultural, political, and social circumstances, 
they write, “There is little evidence to support a direct correlation between the level of 
alcohol price in a country and the level of drinking.” However, Österberg (1995) 
demonstrates that there is a direct link between alcohol and price, concluding, “the 
evidence examined above suggests that alcohol price levels do have an independent effect 
on the level of alcohol consumption.”  The tendency of alcohol industry actors to present 
accurately supported claims among unsupported claims is particularly concerning since 
including a reference in sentences with a multiple claims implies that the reference 
corroborates the entire sentence, not just a portion. 
These examples demonstrate that, while the process of peer-review provides some level 
of quality assurance for original published articles, it can provide no assurance regarding 
the use of these articles as citations. Policymakers and officials reviewing industry 
submissions can therefore not assume that those which employ peer-reviewed citations 
do so accurately, at least not without some assessment of the cited material. The track 
record of alcohol industry actors in framing issues in ways which support their interests, 
misrepresenting facts, and employing weak and (as we now show) potentially misleading 
citations, reinforces McCambridge and colleagues (2010) assessment that evidence-
based policy-making may be more difficult to achieve where industry actors are involved.  
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This finding is important in the context of the Scottish and UK governments’ 
commitments to working in partnership with alcohol industry, as well as broader 
international acceptance of industry participation in alcohol control policy debates 
(Casswell 2013, Collin 2012, WHO 2010). The findings presented in this paper add to the 
growing literature which highlights a need for policymakers to carefully examine alcohol 
industry claims about potential (and existing) policy efforts to reduce alcohol related 
harms especially where any such policy may be perceived as a threat to industry 
profitability. Although the findings presented in this paper relate only to the alcohol 
industry, similar research, focusing on the ways in which other industries cite research 
(especially peer-reviewed outputs) would be a useful next step, enabling cross-industry 
comparisons. 
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